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Unlike many other animals, man does not abandon his handi-
capped offspring. Rather he shelters him, hopes for him, dreams
for him, and loves him.'
The birth of a healthy baby holds for the parents a sense of victory and
a vanquishing of fears. The birth of Merrit Beattie must not have been that
for his parents. For little Merrit (or "Bud" as he came to be called) was
born a victim of cerebral palsy, a handicapped child-the beginning of a
confusing, guilt-ridden, hostile, sorrowful and frustrating experience for
Bud and his parents. Characteristic of those who engendered such
emotions, especially frustration, were the educators who were apologetic
but helpless, so they claimed, because there was neither time, resources,
nor room to handle a child like Bud.
Bud Beattie was born in a small town in northern Wisconsin in the
spring of 1905. The brain damage was caused during delivery of the baby.
Bud was more fortunate than other cerebral palsy victims because damage
was only to the nervous system affecting his muscles, including his speech.
There was no damage to that area of the brain responsible for thought or
memory.
Little was known about cerebral palsy in 1905; the standard reaction
to the inquiries of Bud's parents was to put the child in a "home" since he
could never develop into a "normal" human being. Fortunately, Bud's
aunt was a physician and sought for him the best medical care available at
the time. In addition, the Beattie family was gifted with strength and
foresight and made every effort to raise Bud as if he were a normal child.
His father and grandfather built ramps and special paraphernalia to teach
him to walk and to build up his muscular system. Therapy as a medical
treatment was unheard of in those days, so the family assumed the
responsibility.
Bud was a very bright child. He was taught to read and write at an
early age. His writing was cumbersome and not easily read because of the
limited muscle control in his fingers and hands. By the time Bud was eight
years old, however, his writing had improved, and he had learned to use a
special typewriter that his family had purchased for him. Bud was finally
ready and eager to go to school.
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The school system accepted Bud as it would any other child. He was
put in regular classes and responded well. His progress was very good, and
there were no complaints registered by either his teachers or his fellow
students. Bud, after all, was a likable child, and could not help the way he
walked and talked or the facial contortions. His drooling was something
the other children had learned to live with. Some of the children made fun
of him, of course, and mimicked him, but Bud learned to handle the
hardships because his family was supportive.
During this period of Bud's life he was encouraged by his family to do
things other young boys did. He mowed lawns if the job was within his
physical capabilities. He sold newspapers on the street corner, and after his
father built him a special tricycle, he was able to peddle magazines on a
regular route. He had a concession stand at the baseball park that his
sisters helped him operate. Bud also sold Christmas trees and made
deliveries to homes by pulling the tree on a sled. Bud was an ambitious boy.
In the fall of 1917 when Bud was ready to begin the sixth grade, the
Superintendent of Schools notified the Beatties that their son would not be
allowed to continue in school. There had been a complaint from a
classmate that Bud's condition "bothered" her.2 Bud's parents objected to
this treatment, and in response, a special meeting of the Board of
Education was called. At that meeting it was confirmed that Bud would not
be allowed to continue his education in public school. The Beatties
brought suit against the Board of Education in local court, and the jury
rendered a decision to reinstate the child.
The defendant Board of Education appealed the case to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.3 The supreme court, deciding the case in 1919, reversed
and held that Bud Beattie could be excluded from public school because he
had a negative effect on the teachers and school children. The court stated:
"The right of a child of school age to attend the public schools of this state
cannot be insisted upon when its presence therein is harmful to the best
interests of the school This, like other individual rights, must be
subordinated to the general welfare. 4 The implication of the court was
that an individual child's right to attend school is of less importance than
the overall welfare of the staff and student body. Therefore, a handicapped
child could either be placed in a special class or entirely excluded from
public school, whichever was better for the system. Only the dissenting
judge pointed out that there had been no evidence presented in the trial
court that the boy's presence had a harmful effect.5
Bud's parents hired a private tutor for their son, but had to
discontinue the lessons because of the expense. Therefore, Bud's formal
2. According to Beattie family sources, the complaint came from the daughter of the President of
the Board of Education.
3. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919).
4. Id. at 233, 172 N.W. at 155 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 236, 172 N.W. at 155.
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training probably amounted to an eighth grade education. From that time
on, he taught himself, with the help of his family. He was an avid reader, so
he continued to learn.
Bud Beattie did not give up. He continued to be active in his
community. One of his fondest accomplishments was initiating the
Christmas decorations on Main Street. When his ideas expanded and he
was not able to do the work himself, he turned thejob over to the Chamber
of Commerce.
Bud has been self-employed all of his life. He sold advertising for civic
programs and other public affairs. He had customers as far as 150 miles
from his home and traveled by bus or by train, or even hitchhiked to carry
on his business. Sometimes that meant he walked ten to fifteen miles a day.
When Bud retired in 1966, compelled by deteriorating health, the City
of Antigo Chamber of Commerce awarded him a lifetime membership for
his many civic efforts over the years. It was the first time that organization
had ever so honored one of its citizens. His city had finally recognized
him.6
The Bud Beattie story and the Wisconsin Supreme Court's role in it
are representative of both early social and judicial philosophy toward the
treatment of exceptional children.7 Those philosophies have changed over
the years, but the changes have been slow.3 This paper will explore the
evolution of the right to an equal educational opportunity for the
handicapped, its judicial and legislative recognition, and its present-day
implementation.
As Stanley Herr points out: "Rights are generally exercised by the
assertive. Legal systems do not often better themselves for those too
inactive or infirm to protest fundamental deprivation." 9 Today, however,
advocates for the rights of the handicapped, like those for many other
groups deprived of their rights yet unable to defend themselves, have
6. Mr. Beattie is still living in Antigo, Wisconsin. The writer, also a native of Antigo, is well-
acquainted with Mr. Beattie and his family. The details of Mr. Beattie's story were supplied from
records the family had kept and personal recollections by Mr. Beattie and family members.
7. See also Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893). The Beattie
majority relied extensively on Watson, which, without regard for notions of due process, held that a
local school district could expel a student who continued to exhibit disorderly conduct either
voluntarily or by reason of imbecility. The Watson court, quoting from the school districtes records,
stated: "[H]e is so weak in mind as not to derive any marked benefit from instruction, and,
further, ...he is troublesome to other children. . . .He is also found unable to take ordinary,
decent physical care of himself." 157 Mass. at 561, 32 N.E. at 864.
8. Very early treatment ofthe mentally retarded should be contrasted to the treatment at the time
of the Beattle case.
Until the last half of the 19th century, the retarded were commonly regarded as "feeble-
minded" and treated accordingly. No differentiation was made between the retarded and the
insane. Both, therefore, were locked in the same institutions, whether that was an asylum, a
poorhouse or a house of correction. Many were forced out of the institutions by
overcrowding, only to wander the streets and fend for themselves.
Comment, The Least Restrictive Environment Section ofthe Educationfor All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975: A Legislative History and An Analysis, 13 GONz. L. REv. 717, 743 (1978).
9. Herr, Rights Into Action: Protecting Human Rights of the Mentally Handicapped, 26 CAT1i.
U.L. lCtv. 204 (1976).
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served notice that this deprivation will no longer be tolerated.10 It remains
to be seen whether current remedies are effective toward eliminating past
injustices.
I. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A RIGHT TO
EQUAL EDUCATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED
A. Brown v. Board of Education
The importance of the right to an equal education was first recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in 1954 in Brown v. Board of
Education." The Court in Brown stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.'
2
The holding of Brown was based on the concept of equality once the state
had provided public education; the Court did not explicitly consider
whether education was a constitutionally guaranteed right.
Therefore, any impetus for a guaranteed right to equal education had
to come from state programs. Most state-mandated special education
programs, however, had been monolithic in nature and designed for the
educational needs of entire categories of handicapped children. As a result,
those children with differing degrees of a particular handicapping
condition and those with multiple handicaps were riot adequately served.
Educational programs were not designed to meet the special needs of
individual children.13 Educational placements made in many local
education agencies were arbitrary and capricious, providing little
explanation by the public schools of the educational justification for the
placement. This condition prompted Dr. Sidney Marland, United States
Commissioner of Education, to state in 1971 that six out of every ten
handicapped children in America were not receiving special education
services. Dr. Marland further stated:
The right of a handicapped child to the special education needs is as basic to
him as is the right of any other young citizen to an appropriate education in
the public schools. It is unjust for our society to provide handicapped children
10. See Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 995 (1972).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
13. J. WILSON, THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HIiALTII SYSTEM 156 (1978).
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with anything less than [the] full and equal education opportunity they need
to reach their maximum potential and attain rewarding, satisfying lives.'
4
The concept of equal education for all children is especially applicable
and compels attention in the case of the mentally retarded. Unlike many
other handicapping conditions, mental retardation is a learning disability
which by its very nature requires education as the therapy for the disability.
Without special attention, the mentally retarded person might never learn.
The past and present disastrous state of education for the mentally
retarded emphasizes the need. In the vast majority of states the mentally
retarded (as well as the mentally ill, physiologically impaired, and learning
disabled) children have been routinely excluded from public schools either
by operation of law or by administratively approved informal processes.' 5
The statutory provisions have been in some cases so vague as to be legally
suspect. For example, a Nevada statute authorized exclusion if the"child's
physical or mental condition or attitude is such as to .. .render
inadvisable his attendance at school."'' 6 Alaska permitted the exclusion of
children with physical or mental conditions that rendered attendance
impractical. 17 In addition to this specific statutory exclusion, states have
classified handicapped children in ways that officially sanction exclusion.
Children have traditionally been labeled "educable mentally retarded,"
"trainable mentally retarded," "emotionally disturbed," and other similar
classifications. States have used these labels to exclude certain children or
to "excuse" them from the public schools. 18 One major survey found that in
1971 only thirty-six percent of the country's retarded children were in
educational programs of any kind.' 9 Patterns for dealing with these
"problem" children had developed. The "slow" child's parents were told to
wait until a class small enough for their child was available. The parents of
the "profoundly handicapped and mentally retarded" child were told that
there were no suitable learning programs in the school system for their
child. The parents were then left with the choice of institutionalizing the
child, keeping the child at home despite a lack of adequate supervision, or
providing for full-time, round-the-clock caretaking. The second "choice"
was usually unrealistic, and the third "choice" exorbitantly expensive.
Therefore, the decision-ultimately a foregone conclusion-was reluc-20
tantly to commit the child to a public institution. One such institution's
quality of care was challenged in New York State Associationfor Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller,2' and the conditions described in the opinion in
14. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, TIlE MEN'TALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW 254 (1976).
15. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYs'T IN TRANSTxO.M 132 (1975).
16. NEv. REV. STAT. § 392.050 (1962).
17. ALAsKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (1971).
18. Wilson, supra note 13, at 156.
19. Stone, supra note 15, at 132.
20. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND TIlE LAw, supra note 14, at 253-54 (1976).
21. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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that case have been summarized as "sorely overcrowded, underfunded and
understaffed, improperly managed . . . barely suitable for physical
survival, let alone habilitation and education."22 The resulting strong
association between mental retardation and institutions was one of the
major impediments to educational reforms since it fostered the attitude
that the mentally retarded were not able to learn and that they should
therefore be institutionalized. The cycle was one of a self-fulfilling
prophecy.23
B. The PARC and Mills Decisions
Although the Supreme Court stressed the importance of education in
Brown, the special needs of the mentally retarded for education did not
receive major attention until the first landmark case in this area of the law
was decided in 1971. In that case, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania [PARC ],24 a class action was filed on behalf of
mentally retarded children who had been excluded from the public schools
pursuant to a statutory scheme because they were "uneducable" or "un-
able to profit" from further school attendance. A three-judge federal
district court panel approved a consent decree in which the parties agreed
that all mentally retarded children are capable of benefiting from a
program of education and training. The court noted that most mentally
retarded children are capable of achieving self-sufficiency, and that the
remainder are capable of achieving a lesser degree of self care.25 The
agreements reached were legal milestones. Because Pennsylvania
recognized its responsibility to provide a free public education to all its
children, it agreed to place each mentally retarded child in a "free, public
program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity." 2
6
To ensure such a result, the state agreed to have its Attorney General issue
opinions to effectively foreclose use of the challenged statutes as
exclusionary devices.27
A process of identification, evaluation, and placement was called for
by the consent decree in PARC, following which an educational program
was to be provided to each member of the class by a scheduled deadline. 28
In addition, PARC included some very significant due process safeguards:
no mentally retarded child, or child believed to be mentally retarded,
would be assigned or reassigned to either a regular or special education
placement without notice and an opportunity for a due process hearing
before a special hearing officer who was independent of the local school
22. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 14, at 254.
23. Comment, supra note 8, at 743.
24. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
25. Id. at 1259.
26. Id. at 1260.
27. Id. at 1260-66.
28. Id. at 1266-67.
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district. Two mental retardation specialists were appointed by the court to
review and approve the state's implementation plan.29
Other provisions of the decree were that the mentally retarded would
be provided with preschool services equivalent to any established by the
state for normal children, and that mentally retarded children would be
eligible for private (home) education grants on the same basis as physically
disabled children.30
It was of particular note that the court upheld its jurisdiction 3' against
a constitutional claim under both the due process and equal protection
clauses of the United States Constitution. To support the due process
question, the court relied heavily upon the stigma that results from
misplacement or exclusion resulting from the label of "mentally
retarded., 32 Further, making reference to the Brown decision, the court
stated that it had "serious doubt" whether, under equal protection
analysis, mental retardation is a rational classification (as distinguished
from a suspect classification) for the purposes of providing education.3
PARC resulted in a consent decree, and therefore constitutional
questions were addressed but not decided. These questions were
unequivocally settled in Mills v. Board Of Education of the District of
Columbia,34 and the principles enunciated in PARC relating to mentally
retarded children were extended to all handicapped children.35 In Mills,
the district court was faced with a public school system in which advice,
coercion, fabricated suspensions, delays in diagnosis, home assignments,
and other means were employed and resulted in exclusion of children from
the classroom. The court held that no handicapped child could be excluded
from a regular public school assignment unless the child was provided
adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's needs, a
constitutionally adequate prior hearing, and periodic review of the child's
status and progress. The District of Columbia was ordered to provide each
child of school age "a free and suitable publicly-supported education
regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physical or emotional
disability or impairment., 36 A constitutional basis for the system's
obligation was found in the principle stated in Brown that "where the state
29. Id. at 1266.
30. Id. at 1262-63.
31. Jurisdiction was challenged in a later proceeding by an intermediate school district that had
dissented from the consent decree. A three-judge panel upheld the jurisdiction of the earlier panel. 343
F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
32. The court applied the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), to the labeling of children: if "posting" an adult as a habitual
drunkard required a prior hearing, branding a child "retarded" demanded no lesser safeguards. 343 F.
Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
33. 343 F. Supp. at 297.
34. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
35. Id. at 878.
36. Id.
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has undertaken to provide [the opportunity of an education, that
opportunity] is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms."37 Therefore, according to the Mills court, the District of Columbia
had violated the due process clause by denying handicapped children
access to publicly-supported education.
Although neither PARC nor Mills was a full-scale trial on the
merits,38 these two decisions have been frequently treated as representing
judicial recognition of the handicapped child's right to a public
education.3 9 The two decisions resulted in an array of similar cases in other
jurisdictions. One of those suits is particularly noteworthy. In Lebanks v.
Spears,40 in which the plaintiffs were mentally retarded children, the court
followed the reasoning of PARC and Mills but included two additional
features in its order: the education provided had to be oriented toward the
goal of making every child self-sufficient or employable; and educational
opportunities had to be provided to mentally retarded adults who were not
given educational services as children.4 t Other cases brought in the wake of
PARC and Mills followed a different judicial pattern. 4 The courts in
Harrison v. Michigan43 and Tidewater Society for Autistic Children v.
Virginia,44 although nominally denying relief on PARC- and Mills-type
claims, did so on the limited ground that the respective state legislatures
had recognized the need for educating all handicapped children and had
taken action to achieve that goal.
During this period of increased judicial activity on the equal right to
education issue, the greatest efforts seemed to be devoted to the application
of equal protection to the condition of handicapped children. Even after
the PARC and Mills due process safeguards were enunciated, the
exclusion of handicapped children continued and advocates thought it
particularly desirable to invoke the strict scrutiny standard of equal
37. Id. at 875, quoting 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis deleted).
38. In PARC, discussion of the constitutional claims was limited to a jurisdictional
determination of the existence of colorable claims of constitutional violations, and in Mills, since the
District of Columbia did not dispute its obligation to provide education for handicapped children but
simply pleaded insufficient funds (a defense with which the court was not impressed), the court's
discussion of equal protection was limited to a showing of the applicability of the principle to the denial
of education for the handicapped.
39. See Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRacusE L. REv. 995, 1008 (1972); McClung, "Do Handicapped Children
Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?," 3 J.L. & EDUC. 153 (1974). See also 1. R,
REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1975).
40. 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973).
41. See also Maryland Association for Retarded Children v, Maryland, Equity No.
100/182/77676 (Baltimore County Cir. Ct. April 9, 1974); In re G.H.. A Child, 218 N.W.2d 441 (N,D.
1974). It is of particular interest that the latter case was decided after San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See part 1(c) infra.
42. Three patterns ofjudicial behavior in right to education decisions have been identified by at
least one commentator. See Comment, Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 32 Sw. L.J, 605, 617 (1978).
43. 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
44. Civ. No. 426-72-N (E.D. Va. Dec. 26, 1972).
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protection analysis because few discriminatory classifications can
withstand that type of examination.45 The argument has been made that
handicapped children qualify as a "suspect" class because they are a
vulnerable and stigmatized minority, lacking in political power and
frequently subject to discrimination.46 Therefore, it has been reasoned, the
legislative classifications that caused the suspect "handicapped" category
to be invoked should be subjected to strict scrutiny and overturned if found
to constitute invidious discrimination. 7
Advocates also espoused the other catalyst of strict scrutiny,
"fundamental interests. ' It was believed that the Brown Court's
statement that "today education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments" 49 was a firm enough foundation for the
theory that education was either a constitutional right or at least a
fundamental interest that could not be denied unless the state could display
a compelling state interest for its denial.50
C. The Impact of Rodriguez
The hopes of equal education advocates were seriously shaken if not
shattered by the Supreme Court's 1973 landmark decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.51 The Court rejected both strict
scrutiny arguments and held instead that education per se was neither a
constitutionally guaranteed right nor a fundamental interest. Justice
Powell, speaking for a bare majority, found that it was not within the
province of the Court to create substantive constitutional rights to
guarantee equal protection of the law. 2 In upholding the Texas scheme for
financing its educational program, Justice Powell applied the traditional
rationality standard, stating: "A century of Supreme Court adjudication
under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application
of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the state's
system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state
purposes. ' 53
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, rejected the majority's assertion that
45. The strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis is discussed in Gray, Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
46. Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class, 40 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 119 (1973);
Wald, The Right to Education, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF TIlE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 833, 836 (1973).
47. Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 1976 Micn.J.L. REF. 110,
114-15.
48. For discussion of a third constitutional claim, the substantive right to an equal educationsee
id. at 118. This theory has been limited in its application.
49. 347 U.S. at 493.
50. Note, supra note 47.
51. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Rodriguez case concerned issues of tax policy and interdistrict
disparities in educational spending.
52. Id. at 33.
53. Id. at 40.
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
only rights recognized in the text of the Constitution should be protected
through strict scrutiny by the Court.5 4 Applying the "sliding scale"
analysis, Justice Marshall stated:
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned
in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitutional
guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the non-
constitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial
scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must
be adjusted accordingly.55
Citing the Court's characterization of education in Brown, Justice
Marshall stated that "education directly affects the ability of a child to
exercise his First Amendment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of
information and ideas, whatever interests he may pursue in life. '56 Justice
Marshall accordingly found in his analysis that the Texas scheme violated
the equal protection rights of students in economically deprived school
districts. The "sliding scale" analysis was endorsed by Justice Brennan who
filed a separate dissent.57
Although Rodriguez did not directly consider the question of
exclusion from free public education,58 the decision was a serious setback
after the progress made in PARC and Mills. Despite Rodriguez, however,
judicial progress continued to be made toward protecting the educational
rights of the handicapped.59 Distinguishing Rodriguez both on its facts
and application of law, courts have invalidated educational programs on
an equal protection analysis when education was provided to only a
portion of the class of mentally retarded or handicapped. In Nickerson v.
Thomson60 the plaintiff alleged that the school board had failed to provide
an adequate special education program to meet the needs of some
categories of physically and mentally handicapped children. Since some
handicapped children were receiving adequate educations, the plaintiff
contended that there was no rational basis for the classification scheme
which thus violated the concept of equal protection of the law. The court
54. Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out that restrictions upon the
right to procreate, the right to vote in state elections, and the right to appeal a criminal conviction were
subject to searching analysis by the Court although no such guarantees were present in the
Constitution. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Reynolds v. Sims; 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55. 411 U.S. at 102-03.
56. Id. at 112.
57. Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. The State of Texas had repeatedly stated in its briefs that it assured every child in every
school district an adequate education. In apparent reliance on this assertion, the Rodriguez Court
never reached the question of the handicapped child's access to free public education.
59. Although in In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N,Y.S.2d 13 (1976), the New
York Court of Appeals followed Rodriguez, the unique status of the blind and the deaf provided the
rationale for upholding different educational programs for the students with those handicaps as
compared with different programs for other handicapped students in the same school system,
60. 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974).
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held that the statutorily-imposed duty to maintain special education
facilities required equality of state action under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
In Fialkowski v. Shapp6t multiple handicapped students brought a
section 198362 action against state officials, claiming that state educhlion
programs did not benefit them with an appropriate education as those
programs did for less severely handicapped. The court distinguished
Rodriguez on factual grounds, noting that while Rodriguez dealt with
inferior education, Fialkowski alleged a complete denial of education. The
court stated that "it would thus appear not inconsistent with Rodriguez to
hold that there exists a constitutional right to a certain minimum level of
education as opposed to a constitutional right to a particular level of
education."6 3 The court also accepted the plaintiffs' contention that the
class of retarded children was a suspect class as defined in Rodriguez. "[A
class] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. '64 The court then applied the test of strict
judicial scrutiny and concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for
relief.
Employing a strange mixture of fundamental interest and equal
protection analysis, the court in Frederick L v. Thomas6 determined that
children with learning disabilities made out a claim of discrimination and
unequal treatment under section 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that they were
being denied public education and training appropriate to their needs
while appropriate education was provided for "normal" and "retarded"
pupils. Plaintiffs also claimed that they were subjected to unlawful
discrimination since some students with learning disabilities were given
special instruction and they were not. The district court characterized the
right to education as a quasi-fundamental interest.66 The court found that
an intermediate standard of review was appropriate, stating:. "We think
that the Supreme Court, if presented with the plaintiffs' equal protection
claim, would apply the as yet hard to define middle test of equal protection,
sometimes referred to as 'strict rationality.' ,,67 In its analysis, the court
emphasized the tremendous professional problems in developing a
program for the class of handicapped persons represented by the plaintiffs
whose learning disabilities are often difficult to analyze.68
61. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1975).
63. 405 F. Supp. at 958.
64. 411 U.S. at 28 (1973).
65. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
66. Id. at 836. The court founded this analysis on the Supreme Court's determination that sex is a
quasi-suspect class in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
67. 408 F. Supp. at 836.
68. Id.
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II. LEGISLATIVELY-IMPOSED RIGHT OF EQUAL EDUCATION
FOR THE HANDICAPPED-AN ANSWER TO Rodriguez
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez has been
distinguished, the Court's posture has infringed on the right to education
for the handicapped and the ease of establishing that such a constitutional
right does exist. It therefore became obvious to professionals and
lawmakers after Rodriguez that judicial decisionmaking was not
comprehensive enough and was insufficient to ensure that all handicapped
children would be afforded an appropriate public education. To wait until
federal district courts in fifty states plus the territories ruled that such
education was a constitutional right was, according to many, to wait too
long. Legislation was needed as an alternative to the inadequate
courtroom response. 9
Prior to 1971, mandatory education legislation covering all
handicapped children existed in only seven states; and in another twenty-
six states, legislation covered only certain categories of the handicapped.
Education for the mentally retarded was often excluded. Lack of funding,
of course, contributed to this result; however, the continuing notion that
the mentally retarded could not learn was the major force stalling the
necessary legislation.70 The PARC and Mills decisions proved to be the
impetus that was needed. Subsequent to those court actions many states
enacted mandatory legislation for education of the handicapped.
Inadequate funding and enforcement efforts, unfortunately, prevented the
legislation from achieving its goals.7' It continued to be recognized,
however, that the major legal basis of authority for education had
developed as a power of the states, and that it would only be through major
revisions of the state education statutes that sweeping changes in the
quality of education for the handicapped would occur.72 The solution was
federal legislation mandating that action by the states.
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In 1973, Congress responded to the social and educational dilemma
with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.73 Section 504 is broad civil
rights legislation requiring states that accept federal funding for education
to adopt and administer educational policy that does not violate equal
protection and due process of law. The section provides in part that "no
otherwise qualified handicapped individual .. . shall, solely by reason of
his handicap be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
69. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND TIlE LAW, supra note 14, at 267,
70. Comment, supra note 8, at 746.
71. Id. at 754.
72. WILSON, supra note 13, at 156.
73. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
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receiving Federal financial assistance." 74 Section 504 was therefore a piece
of proscriptive legislation, which did not mandate any particulars for
compliance, and which did not even include direct reference to
education." The Department of Health, Education and Welfare [HEW],
interpreting section 504 to include education,76 established affirmative
obligations in its push for Public Law No. 94-142."
B. Public Law No. 94-142
Public Law No. 94-142, or The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975,78 was an unprecedented permanent commitment by
the federal government that the eight million handicapped children in the
United States would receive a free appropriate public education. The states
and local educational agencies, to be eligible for federal financial assistance
in meeting the direct costs of educating the handicapped, were required to
agree to implement elaborate procedural safeguards and guarantees to
ensure that a child's education would be appropriate.79 The parameters of
94-142 were fashioned in part by the PARCand Mills decisions, especially
in the area of due process safeguards. The cases were influential in shifting
the drafters' focus away from the institutions and into the regular
classroom since each decision had expressed a preference for regular
classroom placement (Mills) or the least restrictive alternative (PARC).10
Although it was explained at the congressional hearings leading up to the
enactment of 94-142 that PARC and Mills were not firmly grounded in
constitutional doctrine,81 the explanation was virtually ignored. Rather,
the supporters of the Act perceived PARC and Mills and other pending
right to education cases82 as constitutionally guaranteeing an equal
education opportunity. 8 It was therefore the sentiment of the lawmakers
74. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) (amended in 1975 to include all types of handicaps).
75. In addition, there were no interpretive regulations promulgated until May 4, 1977.
76. The only U.S. Supreme Court decision to date interpreting the HEW regulation
promulgated to supplement § 504 is Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361(1979).
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that educational institutions do not have to lower
or substantially modify their standards to admit handicapped persons to comply with § 504
regulations. The Court found nothing in the history or language of§ 504 that limits the freedom of an
educational institution to require reasonable physical qualifications foradmission to a clinical training
program. According to that decision, an "otherwise qualified person" is one who is able to meet all of
the program's requirements despite his handicap.
77. Pub. L. No. 94-142,89 Stat. 773 (codified at20 U.S.C. §§ 1401.-61 (Supp. V 1975) (amending
Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-21, 88 Stat. 579 (1974), which was passed by Congress as an emergency
measure rather than wait for the more comprehensive legislation of 94-142).
78. Id.
79. Compliance by the states could not be avoided by referring a child to private schools or
facilities since the Act's provisions apply regardless of where the child is referred to or placed. See
Comment, supra note 8, at 719.
80. Id. at 752.
81. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
82. Forty-six right-to-educate cases were completed or pending. Comment,supra note 8,at 751.
83. See S. REP. No. 168,94th Congress, 1st Session 6 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 332,94th Cong., 1st
Session 4-3 (1975). Congressional members found it "in the national interest to assist [the] state and
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that it was inequitable that the parents of handicapped children should
have to continue to seek redress in the courts when the states had a
constitutional obligation to implement equal educational opportunities. 84
Public Law No. 94-142 did not replace section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for purposes of nondiscrimination of the
handicapped in public education, but rather added to the Federal
government's enforcement arsenal. While section 504 is a broad, all-
encompassing civil rights prohibition that has its main impact in the field
of employment discrimination, it is still relied on to enforce integration of
the handicapped in the educational setting,85 especially at the local level.86
The main thrust toward the guarantee of an equal education for the
handicapped, however, is concentrated in enforcing and monitoring
compliance with 94-142. In May of 1977, HEW promulgated final
regulations for section 504 that interpreted the languae of 504 as requiring
most of the major guarantees contained in 94-142.8:
1. The Goals of 94-142
Congress enacted 94-142 to accomplish four far-reaching goals: (1) to
assure that all handicapped children would have available to them a free
appropriate public education, with an emphasis on special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs; (2) to assure pro-
tection of the rights of the handicapped and their parents; (3) to assist
states and localities to provide for the education for all handicapped
children; and (4) to evaluate and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate handicapped children.88
The term "handicapped children" as amended by the 1975 Act,
includes "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired,
visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically
impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with special
learning disabilities who by reason thereof require special education and
related services." 89 At the time of enactment, it was estimated that there
was a 12.035% prevalence of handicapping conditions among children
aged five to seven, which included a 2.3% prevalence of mental
local efforts . . . in order to assume equal protection of the law." Pub. L. No.94-142, § 3(b)9,89 Stat,
775, Statement of Findings & Purpose.
84. Comment, supra note 8, at 751.
85. The two laws have additional marked contrasts including remedies that are provided,
86. Conversation with Louis Danielson, State Pr6gram Implementation Studies Branch,
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare (April 11, 1979).
87. Comment, supra note 8, at 720.
88. DEPT. OF HEW, PROGRESS TOWARD A FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLiC EDUCATION: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAW 94-142: TlE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN AcT 101 (Jan. 1979).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. V 1975). The final regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,474 (1977), further
define "mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with deficite [sic] in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period,
which adversely affect a child's educational performance."
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retardation.90 According to the findings of Congress, of the eight million
handicapped children in the United States, more than one-half did not
receive appropriate educational services that would enable them to have
full equality of opportunity."
Public Law No. 94-142 is a major piece of legislation. The Act and its
implementing regulations cover hundreds of pages. It is the purpose of this
section of the paper to introduce and discuss the most significant
provisions of the Act-those provisions that relate directly to solving the
dilemma faced by the Beattie family in 1919. Emphasis will be on the
implementation at the classroom level, with special attention to the
attitudes and roles of the professionals concerned.
2. Administration of the Act
Public Law No. 94-142 requires that each state education agency
[SEA] is responsible for administering, monitoring, and evaluating the
implementation of the Act and overseeing the efforts of the local educa-
tional agencies [LEAs] toward the desired ends. Ultimate responsibility
for ensuring implementation at the state level lies with the Bureau of
Education for the Handicapped [BEH] within HEW's Office of Education.
Each SEA must file an annual program plan [APP] with BEH,
providing detailed explanation of how the funding will be used to achieve
the goal of educating the handicapped. Section 616(a) of the Act sets up the
Bureau's monitoring of this implementation on the state level. No funding
may be awarded unless a completed APP has been received and approved
by the Bureau. Only one state, New Mexico, did not submit a plan and is
not currently receiving support under 94-142.92
The APPs are useful for reporting planning data,93 but actual
progress can be measured only through observation. BEH has therefore
established a system of regular site visits to the fifty-eight states and
territories to conduct Program Administrative Reviews [PARs]. Thirty
different administrative variables are used to evaluate the SEA. The basic
purposes of the PARs are first, to evaluate the state's policies, procedures,
and practices in light of Federal regulations and the state's APP; and
second, to determine the extent to which handicapped children in
institutions supported by 94-142 funds are receiving appropriate services. 94
The Bureau reviews at least one-half of the states and territories each
year, with the exception of New York and California, which are visited
90. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Congress, 1st Session 11 (1975).
91. Pub. L. No. 94-142m §§ (b)l, (3), 89 Stat. 774, Statement of Findings & Purpose.
92. DEPT. oF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 72.
93. The APP is theoretically a very useful planning and reporting tool. In practice, however,
BEH has found APP response by SEAs to lack in detailand direction and to be ineffective as a means of
evaluation. Conversation with Roger Coates, Management Analysis Center, Washington, D.C.
(March 2, 1979).
94. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 72.
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every year. Visits to LEAs, in addition to the SEA facilities, are a part of
the evaluation. When evidence of noncompliance is found, the BEH report
to the SEA describes the necessary corrective actions and sets a deadline
for compliance. Monitoring is continued until compliance is achieved.
According to the Act, by September 1, 1978, a "free, appropriate
public education" had to be available for all handicapped children aged
three to eighteen, and by September 1, 1980, all handicapped children of
ages three through twenty-one must be accommodated.95 An agency
seeking funds is required to identify, locate, and evaluate all handicapped
children within the agency'sjurisdiction.9 6 This is referred to by the Bureau
of Education For the Handicapped as "Childfind." The Act also requires
that agencies give first priority to children not yet receiving funds, and
second priority to the most severely handicapped within each category
who are currently receiving an inadequate education.
3. Least Restrictive Environment
Probably the most controversial requirement of the Act is the Least
Restrictive Environment (LRE) concept, which mandates that all
handicapped children have an "appropriate" education and be placed in
the regular classroom with children who are not handicapped, whenever
possible.97 Removal of the handicapped child from the regular classroom
should occur only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 98 This section of the Act demonstrates
two motivations by Congress: getting handicapped children into the
regular educational environments, and making sure that removal occurs
only under limited circumstances.
The practice of ensuring the Least Restrictive Environment has come
to be known as "mainstreaming." Opponents of the concept argue that
mainstreaming is really just "dumping" exceptional children back into the
regular classroom without further consideration.99 Sources at BEH,
however, feel that the characterization as "dumping" may be the result of a
failure to understand the legislative intent behind the mainstreaming
mandate.' 00 The concept of Least Restrictive Environment is based on the
assumption that every child, handicapped or not, can benefit from a
regular education, and that a majority of handicapped children have mild
handicapping conditions and can be readily served in regular classrooms
when intensive specialized instruction is given for part of the day. It was
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)B (Supp. V 1975). No provision need be made by these dates for
handicapped children age 3 to 5 and 18 to 21 if state law does not so require,
96. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)B (Supp. V 1975). There is a similar requirement under the Rehabilitation
Act regulations. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977) (codified in 45 C.F.R. § 14.32(a)),
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)B (Supp. V 1975).
98. Id.
99. Comment, supra note 8, at 722.
100. Conversation with Louis Danielson, supra note 86.
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also the outgrowth of a commitment to the development of attitudes and
procedures that recognize isolation of the handicapped child is also
isolation for the "normal" child.' 0 The compelling assumption is that it is
far more beneficial to the child to keep him in the normal environment than
to remove him and struggle to obtain a meaningful and stigma-free re-
entry later.
102
Although the concept of mainstreaming has recently attracted a great
deal of attention, it is based on a body of sentiment long expressed both
by courts and by state laws. 0 3 As demonstrated, Brown v. Board of
Education, PARC, and Mills established the proposition that, given two
or more alternative educational settings, the handicapped child should be
placed in the least drastic or most normal setting appropriate.'0 4 During
the same time period, it was established in Wyatt v. Stickney'05 that
placement in an institutional residence must be shown to be the least
restrictive setting feasible for that individual.
In addition to these court decisions, by 1975 at least twenty states had
required placement in the least restrictive manner, either by state laws
pertaining to education of the handicapped children or by regulations.,06
Therefore, the principle of Least Restrictive Environment was firmly
established before 94-142 was enacted. In fact, local school districts in
several states have histories of a decade or more of mainstreaming
handicapped children into regular education classes.10 7
What constitutes an "appropriate" educational placement is a matter
for local determination. The principle of Least Restrictive Environment
requires that the decision be made on an individual basis and not according
to generalizations or group labels. The Act does not require that all
handicapped children, regardless of the severity of their handicaps, be
"mainstreamed" into regular education classes. There was no intent that
every handicapped child be placed in the regular classroom.," It is
anticipated that there will be instances in which particular children should
be placed in settings other than the regular classroom. There must,
101. Id.
102. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND TIlE LAW, supra note 14, at 516.
103. Id. at 514.
104. Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich. 1972), is also instructive on the subject
of Least Restrictive Environment. The court in Harrison, although dismissing the suit on procedural
grounds, noted the need forspecial education programs and services designed to develop the maximum
potential necessary to the education of every handicapped child.
105. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
106. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 32.
107. Id. at 33.
108. See H. R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1975):
When it is clear that because of the nature or severity of a child's handicap, the child must be
educated in a setting other than the regular class, it is appropriate to implement such a
placement. However, the least restrictive environment provision is also designed as a rights
provision to protect against indiscriminate placement of a child in a separate facility solely
because the child is handicapped and not because special education is needed in that type of
setting.
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however, be valid supportive reasons for taking that action, and these
reasons must be based on the nature or severity of the child's handicap and
the child's individual needs for special education and related services.
10 9
Public Law No. 94-142's implementing regulations"' require each
public agency to ensure the availability of alternative placements to meet
handicapped children's various educational needs. At a minimum, these
alternatives must include regular classes, special classes, special schools,
home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.I" Ac-
cording to these regulations, the placement decision is to be made by a
group of persons who are knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of
the evaluation data, and the placement options. There has been a trend
toward including both regular and special education teachers and princi-
pals in the placement decision. Parents are often invited to attend the
meetings, although the Act requires parental participation only in the
Individualized Educational Program [IEP] meeting. 12 The 94-142 regu-
lations require that the IEP govern placement decisions, thereby taking
into account the child's characteristics and the specific objectives of his
or her instructional program. The BEH report to Congress on the first
year's implementation of 94-142, however, indicates that as long as the
placement decision is clearly a part of the individualized program, it is
not important whether the IEP came before the placement or vice versa."13
Section 121a.552 of the 94-142 regulations specify criteria that should
be considered when placing the child. Children should be placed as close to
their homes as possible, preferably in those schools they would normally
attend. Another criteria is found in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which states: "it should be stressed that, where a handicapped
student is so disruptive in a regular classroom that the education of other
students is significantly impaired, the needs of the handicapped child
cannot be met in that environment. Therefore, regular placement would
not be appropriate to his or her needs ... .
As part of the appropriate placement effort, 94-142 requires states to
demonstrate that procedures have been established to ensure that the
testing and evaluation materials and procedures used are not racially or
culturally discriminatory.' 15 Therefore, materials and procedures must be
provided in the child's native language, and no one evaluative method can
be the sole criterion for determining placement. Proof of the need for
109. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 41.
110. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.551 (1978).
I1I. See Gallagher, The Special Education Contract for Mildly flandicapped Children, 38
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 527 (1972).
112. See text accompanying notes 132-35 infra.
113. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 42.
114. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (App. Subpt. D, 24 1978).
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (Supp. V. 1975).
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safeguards in the evaluation process is found in the PARC decision, in
which the plaintiffs, alleging that many mentally retarded children were
systematically excluded from a public education, won a consent decree
that the educational placement of such children must be based on careful
evaluation procedures."16 Studies have also shown that the results of
culturally or racially biased tests may result in inappropriate designation
of minority children as handicapped." 7 Therefore, the Act includes
detailed evaluation provisions including evaluation through a variety of
materials, screening and mandatory periodic evaluation." 8
It is the opinion of both BEH and Council For Exceptional Children
officials that the Least Restrictive Environment concept will improve the
self image of handicapped children. According to Bureau sources,
improved self-worth is often the necessary catalyst toward improved
educational achievement and, in this situation, toward ultimate
satisfactory assimilation into society as adults." 9
4. Due Process Protections
Perhaps the most critical requirements of 94-142 are its due process
safeguards, which place special emphasis on the rights of the handicapped
child and his parents or guardians. The Act includes provisions for (1)
notice to parents or guardians of a change in educational placement of the
child;12 0 (2) the right to a free "impartial due process hearing;"' 2' (3) the
right to all relevant school records; (4) the right to an independent
evaluation;122 and (5) the right to an appeal to the state education agency, if
the initial due process hearing was conducted by the local educational
agency, and to a further appeal in either state or federal court.123 The
hearing procedures are of crucial importance to ensure that the least
restrictive environment is effectively made available. The parent has an
opportunity at the hearing to present complaints about any matter that
relates to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the
child. 24 Thus, the parents can help to assure program adequacy.
At the time of the enactment of 94-142, the Council for Exceptional
Children estimated that special education legislation in twelve states
included due process requirements, and an additional thirteen states had
116. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
117. S. TORRES, SPECIAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES MANUAL (Reston, Va. Council
for Exceptional Children 1977).
118. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 103.
119. Conversation with Louis Danielson. sutra note 87.
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)l(c) (Supp. V 1975).
121. Id. § 1415(b)2.
122. Id. § 1415(b)l(a).
123. Id. §§ 1415(c)-{e).
124. Id. § 1415(b)l(e).
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regulations containing these protections. 25 Today, twenty-three states
have passed education legislation that includes due process safeguards,
and virtually every state has these types of requirements in its state
regulations. 126
5. Description of Services Under 94-142
Special education is defined in the implementing regulations for 94-
142 as consisting of "specially designed instruction, at no cost to the
parent, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including
classroom instruction in physical education, home instruction, and
instruction in hospitals and institutions."'127 "Related services" is defined
as:
transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services as are required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education, and includes speech pathology, audiology, psychological services,
physical and occupational therapy, recreation, early identification and
assessment of disabilities in children, counseling services, and medical
services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. 128
The term includes parent counseling and training, school health services,
and social work services in schools. 129 Implicit in the Act and its
regulations is the requirement that a wide array of services should be
available to meet the handicapped child's needs; however, the ap-
propriateness of the services will vary greatly according to the individual
needs, and not every school will be expected to provide every service.
130
The most specific of services required by 94-142 is the Individualized
Educational Program [IEP].13 1 The Act is based on the premise that all
handicapped children are entitled to an appropriate education-an
education geared to their individual needs. That right is perhaps most
clearly reflected in the Act's regulations which mandate that an
Individualized Education Program must be developed to educate each
handicapped child. An IEP is a written statement developed in any
meeting by representatives of the Local Education Agency who shall be
qualified to provide or supervise the provision of instruction to meet the
needs of the teacher, the parent or guardian, and, when appropriate, the
child. 32 This Program is to include an indication of the child's present
125. COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, STATE POLICY REGARDING DUg PROCESS AND
MAINSTREAMING (1974).
126. L. KOTIN, DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: LEGAL PI:IRSPECTIVES 12 (1976),
127. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.14 (1978).
128. Id. § 121a.13.
129. J. KAKALIK, SERVICES FOR HANDICAPPED YOUTI: A PROGRAM OVERVIEW, SANTA MONICA,
CA. (Rand Corp. Rep. No. R1220 1973).
130. One of the most successful approaches to the delivery of scrvices has been the Fail-Snve
Program developed by Reynolds. This program provides a continuum of services at different levels
depending on the severity of a child's condition and integrates these services into the public school
system. Reynolds, A Framewvdrk for Considering Some Issues in Special Education, 28 EXCEPrIONAL
CHILDREN 367-70. (1962).
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a) 5 (Supp. V 1975).
132. Id. § 1401 (19).
[Vol. 40: 603
EQ UAL ED UCA TION HANDICAPPED
achievement level; a statement of goals and objectives and projected dates of
attainment; a statement of the specific services to be provided; appropriate
evaluation methods to be implemented on at least an annual basis; and the
extent to which the child will participate in regular classrooms.1 33 The IEP
is intended to reinforce a general trend in education toward individualized
instruction by objectives and educational accountability. 134 Participation
by the parents is of particular importance since it provides them with the
opportunity to judge for themselves whether the school has the capability
to provide their children with the services they feel are necessary for
appropriate education. Parental approval of the IEP is a dramatic
procedural departure in most school districts. 3
5
Teacher training is another essential service provided by the mandates
of 94-142. Teacher training programs are a necessary tool toward assuring
that handicapped children receive special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs. Teacher training opportunities are
provided from a variety of sources. Institutions of higher learning have
been encouraged to provide special preservice courses that prepare regular
education teachers to work with the handicapped, and to upgrade their
special education training programs. Toward that end, BEH has
supported a series of projects that provide universities an opportunity to
develop a range of teacher training alternatives t3 6 It is a requirement
under the Act that, in developing its plan for the preparation of personnel,
the state must ensure that all public and private institutions of higher
education, and all other agencies and organizations that have an interest in
the preparation of personnel for the education of the handicapped, are
given an opportunity to participate in the development, to review, and to
annually update the personnel preparation system.137
In-service training programs are also essential to the success of
implementation and an integral requirement under the Act. In-service
training is defined as "any training other than that received by an
individual in a full-time program which leads to a degree." ' s In
accordance, BEH has revamped the funding program to meet this need.
133. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.346.
134. Note, supra note 47, at 137.
135. EDUCATION TURNKEY SysTEMs, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS SUMI.ARY. CASE STUDY OF TIlE
INPLEMENTATION OF P.L. 94-142 (1978). The significant legal feature of the IEP is that it facilitates the
development of judicially-manageable standards. The measurement criteria and performance
objectives are defined, thus relieving the courts of the task. It should be noted, however, that failure to
comply with a specific IEP is not suitable for class action litigation that has been the hallmark of the
struggle against exclusionary practices. Id. at 138.
136. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 58.
137. Id. Concern has been registered by individuals at the implementation levels of BEH that the
BEH-university joint effort programs are too programmatic in focus, lacking the necessary emphasis
on implementation skills and continual monitoring. It appears that some programs, especially those at
the Ph.D. level, may be talking around, rather than dealing with, the problem of educating the
handicapped. Conversation with Roger Coates, Management Analysis Center, Washington, D.C.
(April 3, 1977).
138. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.382 (1978).
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Funding of in-service programs is to be steadily increased and particular
emphasis placed on reaching more teachers, especially those in the regular
classroom. BEH recognizes that the mandates of 94-142 cannot be met
without training opportunities through a variety of sources.
1 39
C. Nationwide Implementation of 94-142:
Are the Goals Being Achieved?
The first compliance date established by 94-142 was September 1,
1978. By that date, according to the Act, a "free, appropriate public
education" was to be available for all handicapped children aged three to
eighteen. Therefore, 94-142 is actually only one year old, with the
implementation year 1978-79 as the only evidence by which to evaluate
successes and failures. There are still many questions unanswered, much
data unavailable, and many problems to be solved. Of course, the Bureau
of Education for the Handicapped does not have all the answers. In fact, it
did not even anticipate some of the questions. It is an evolutionary process,
with many dedicated professionals at the various helms, both in
Washington and around the country. In its first annual report to
Congress,1 40 BEH reports that the states have displayed impressive activity
toward achievement of the goals of 94-142, widespread commitment to
those goals, and a genuine attempt to resolve the problems that impede
implementation. 41 It is the purpose of this section of the paper to evaluate
the data reported by BEH, the states, and other interested groups.
The most immediate and obvious consequences of the implemen-
tation of 94-142 are the result of administrative decisions. Within the
Local Education Agencies [LEAs], staff communication procedures for
development of individualized education programs, placements, assess-
ment, and due process considerations are now more formalized. There is
also an increased involvement of school personnel, representing many
disciplines, and a greater participation by parents. Response to the Act has
affected both regular and special education personnel and has resulted in
an identifiable degree of unrest and turf-battling.1
42
Because of significantly expanding screening programs as a response
to Childfind mandates, administrative actions have had two major impacts
on school systems. First, they have led to the definition of new duties that
teachers and other staff members are expected to perform without any
appreciable diminution of previous responsibilities and without increased
compensation. Second, they have created the necessity for staff to make
difficult choices between new and existing duties in the allocation of their
139. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 59-61.
140. An annual report to Congress by BEH on the implementation of 94-142 is mandated as a
part of HEW's administrative responsibility under that Act. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.750 (1978).
141. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 89, at 115-16.
142. EDUCATION TURNKEY SYSTEMS, supra note 135, at 3, and exhibits 1, 2, 3 & 4 therein.
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time and attention.143 These and other problems will be explored more
specifically in the sections following.
1. Are the Handicapped Being Identified
and Served Under 94-142?
"Childfind" the identification of the intended beneficiaries of the Act,
is the logical and essential first step in implementing 94-142. BEH has
accordingly made the identification, evaluation, and placement of all
handicapped children 144 a matter of first priority, recognizing that until all
eligible children are identified and served, the Act cannot achieve the
desired goals and objectives. Since funds are allocated on the basis of state
counts, the identification process takes on added importance.145
BEH statistics indicate that fewer children were served in the school
year 1978-79 than had been anticipated. For that school year, the state
counts 146 indicate that approximately 3.6 million handicapped children
were receiving special education and related services. An additional
200,000-plus handicapped children were counted under a separate Act,147
bringing the total count of children served to 3.8 million. Those children
fall predominately into three categories: speech impaired, learning
disabled, and mentally retarded. BEH figures show that approximately
four million may be significantly less than the actual number of
handicapped children in the five to seventeen year old population. By
Bureau estimates, there should be more than five million school-aged
handicapped, and from seven to eight million handicapped children in the
three to twenty-one year age range.
148
While more than 55,000 more handicapped children were served
during the 1977-78 school year than during 1976-77, and while some states
significantly increased the number of children served, the performance of
many states remained constant and some of the western states even
decreased slightly. Decreases may be attributable to the requirement under
94-142 that all individualized education programs be prepared by October
1, 1977 to be included in the child count.149 An additional contributing
factor may be the differences in identification and assessment procedures
among the states. 50 By way of illustration, the proportion of handicapped
143. EDUCATION TURNKEY SYSTEMS, supra note 135.
144. For definition of "handicapped children," see text accompanying note 89 supra.
145. Da=T. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 77.
146. The allocation of 94-142 funds has been based on theaverage oftwo separate state counts of
handicapped children, one made in October and the other in February of the previous school year.
Congress recently amended the Act (Pub. L. No. 95-561) so that states will count children served only
once each year, i.e., on December 1.
147. Pub. L. No. 89-313, 89 Stat. 1158 (1965).
148. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 16.
149. Id. at 9.
150. Another reason for the lower than expected Childfind figures may be that states are aware
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children served as mentally retarded in California was only .8% of the
state's school-aged population, the lowest among all the states. Since
1974, however, California has had a moratorium on intelligence testing as
a result of the case of Larry P. v. Riles.1 51 That case was a challenge to the
use of I.Q. tests that determine which students were to be placed in
Educable Mentally Retarded [EMR] classes. The district court recently
ruled that the practice is invalid on both statutory and constitutional
grounds. 152
Significant variations exist in the percentages reported by State
Education Agencies. At opposite ends of the spectrum, Utah reports that
11% of the children served in that state are handicapped and Wisconsin
reports less than 5.2%. The figures also show widespread variation in the
particular categories of handicapped children being served. The figures for
the percentage of children served for mental retardation show that the
southeastern states serve the greatest proportions of these children and the
western states serve the fewest percentages.'5 The disparity between the
BEH estimates and the state counts gives reason to believe that many states
are not serving all eligible children. 54 Although there are identifiable
reasons why the state counts may be low, 55 "Childfind" is of critical
concern, and the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped in its first
report to Congress has identified it as the target area for the future
implementation of 94-142. That report states:
State efforts will need to be increasingly geared towardfinding undiagnosed
handicapped children already in school. Though the commitment and energy
that has been devoted to implementation is commendable, there may still be
over a million handicapped children-most of them struggling in regular
classrooms-who have not yet been identified. Over the next two years, the
Bureau will strongly encourage states to improve their screening, referral and
assessment procedures to assure that all handicapped children are identified
and provided the services they deserve. 156
a. Are Handicapped Children Being Appropriately Served?
In addition to the numbers of handicapped children being served, the
question must be asked whether these children are being appropriately
served. This inquiry revolves around the implementation of the Individual
Educational Program [IEP]. The IEP is the necessary tool for meeting the
that the identification of new children means that the state must then come up with the necessary
matching funds under the Act. Conversation with Louis DanielSon, supra note 86.
151. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cai. 1972) (preliminary injunction); No. C-71-2270RFP (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 16, 1979).
152. No. C-71-2270RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979).
153. See text accompanying notes 150-52 supra for a possible contributing factor to the low
percentages in the West.
154. DEPT. oF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 17.
155. In addition to the reasons stated here, see DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 18-19
for a more ihorough discussion.
156. DErT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 116 (emphasis added).
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needs of the individual child, thereby providing him with a meaningful
education. It is the opinion of this commentator157 that the success of 94-
142 will turn on the ability of school personnel to institute effectively the
IEP. The task is a difficult one, and the integral feature is the classroom
teacher. Forecasting success at this time is at best speculative.
The IEP is the heart of 94-142, for even more important than where
you teach the child, is what you teach the child. Children are
communicated with, motivated, taught, and rewarded in a variety of ways.
And those are the "normal" children. Add to those "standard variations"
any one, two, three, or more of the variety of handicaps that can afflict a
child, and the equation for an appropriate education becomes even more
complicated. The gnawing question continues to be whether past
educational practice indicates that the IEP mandates of 94-142 can, and
more importantly will, be met.
The IEP should not be a new conceptual learning tool to the
classroom teacher who will be expected to do much of the implementation
under 94-142. Most progressive teacher training institutes have been
espousing individualized learning for at least a decade. What universities
teach and what teachers actually practice, however, are often far different
things. Individualizing instruction is hard work for the teacher, both
mentally and physically. Finding the right approach for a child is time-
consuming, and the recordkeeping and paperwork can be overwhelming.
After all, the children are not all on the same page in the same book at the
same time. In reality, the children do not need the teacher sometimes, or
even most of the time; rather one child or another needs her all the time.
The scene is definitely far from the traditional classroom where the teacher
had time to grade papers while the children "studied their lessons." And
yet, as hard as individualized instruction may be on the teacher, its rewards
for the child are immeasurable if it is implemented according to a well-
planned and well-tailored program. The problem in the past has been that
most teachers, even those trained in individualization, have not been
willing to take the time necessary to make individualized instruction a
successful experience for themselves and, of most importance, for the
child. Too often poor programming leads to chaos, and the concept of
individualization is abandoned as inappropriate for the regular classroom
setting. What then should lead us to believe that the experience will be any
different with 94-142 when the child's needs as a handicapped child are
added to his needs as an individual child?
A National Education Association study, cited in the BEH report to
Congress, reported that teachers using the IEP approach were enthusiastic
about it, and many indicated that they were particularly gratified by being
able to see the results of their planning and to measure their accomplish-
157. This opinion is based on extensive teaching in public schools through the United States.
The commentator has had in-depth experience with individualized instruction, both in individual
school system programs and in pilot programs sponsored by the federal government.
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ments.158 The underlying message may be that these teachers have not been
accustomed to individualized instruction, which requires that goals be set
and implementation and evaluation be accomplished with the individual
child in mind. It will indeed be an accomplishment if teachers who have not
been familiar with individualizing for the needs of a "normal" child can do
an appropriate job for the handicapped child with Far more complicated
needs.
A recent study found that one of the most common apprehensions felt
by teachers regarding the IEP was that the paperwork would consume time
and energy formerly used for teaching. The IEP process has placed heavy
time demands on teaching staffs, particularly as they attempt to modify
existing mechanisms to accomodate the new requirements of 94-142.11,
Again, the implication is that time will be taken away from teaching, when
in reality extra time must be taken, e.g., time before or after school hours,
but not time during school hours. If time is taken during school hours,
there has merely been a trade off of evils and very lit tie is gained from such
"individualizing." It is upon the willingness to make these "extra"
commitments, and the willingness of school systems to provide "extra"
time that the success or failure of the IEP will turn. Unfortunately, history
does not make success likely.
Based on the above-noted problems inherent in implementing the IEP
mandate, teacher preparation and training are of prime importance. One
of the most often mentioned and criticized problems expressed to BEH
was the shortage of trained personnel. In addition to the lack of training
for regular classroom teachers to implement the IEP, there is a critical need
for special education teachers able to serve as resource consultants for
training regular personnel, and for special education teachers for severely
handicapped children. Fortunately for the future of the program, the
National Center for Education Statistics [NCES] reports a steady growth
during the past few years in the number of graduates in special
education. 160 Presently, however, the supply falls short of the demand for
such professionals. In the fall of 1977, according to NCES there was a
shortage of approximately 3,300 trained special educators, primarily those
specializing in learning disabilities. In addition, that figure is probably
unrealistically low since it was based on funded vacancies, and not on the
needs for implementation of 94-142 requirements.161 The needs forecasted
by the states indicate that the NCES estimation is very low. If the indicated
state needs were aggregated, approximately 65,000 new teachers of special
education were needed for the 1978-79 school year. Projecting that need to
1979-80 and calculating in the normal attrition rate, the need could reach
158. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 105.
159. EDUCATION TURNKFY SYSTEMS, supra note 135.
160. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, CONDITION oF EDUCATION, 162-64 (1978),
161. Id. at 163.
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85,000. Despite intensive efforts encouraged by HEW, however, only
about 20,000 new special education teachers graduate each year.
Therefore, the shortage of qualified personnel will continue to be one of the
most critical issues facing the successful implementation of 94-142.
b. Are the Right Children Being Served?
A second tangential question to whether the handicapped are being
identified and served is the inquiry whether the right children are being
served. This concerns the problem of erroneous classification and labeling
of children. Congress expressed its concern during the hearings preceding
the enactment of 94-142.163 Concern has also been registered in recent
court action 64 and by education professionals. The precise issue is whether
non-handicapped children are being identified as handicapped by current
testing procedures. In its report to Congress, BEH does not emphasize
concern over improper labeling, but addresses it as a predictable potential
ill effect of the assessment process. Taking a "lesser of two evils" approach,
the Bureau states: "[I]f primary concern is directed toward preventing the
incorrect classification of children as handicapped, many eligible
handicapped children may not be identified and served. " '6s While this is of
course true, by virtue of numbers of children affected alone, erroneous
classification and labeling is a real problem and should be a prime concern
in the implementation of 94-142. It should not be treated as an obvious
by-product of "the system" and relegated to the status of a minor issue in
the name of progress. Just as we owe it to the handicapped to accord them
an appropriate education, we have at least equal responsibility to "normal"
children not to impede their progress by labeling them as handicapped
based on inappropriate testing procedures. It would indeed be difficult to
convince the parents of a "normal" child who had been incorrectly labeled
"mildly mentally retarded" that the years their child spent in a program for
the handicapped were not harmful to his expectations. Not much comfort
is provided by a "lesser of two evils" approach.
It should be noted that BEH does address the issue of reducing errors
in assessment and has commissioned experts to advise the states in
assessment procedures. 66 It is, however, the opinion of this commentator
that BEH gives the problem less than adequate attention in its report to
Congress.
2. Are the Needs of Handicapped Children Being
Met in the Least Restrictive Environment?
Public Law No. 94-142's Least Restrictive Environment require-
162. Das'nr. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 55-56.
163. See H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 108.
164. See Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1972); Diana v. California
State Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. C-70-37 RFP (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1970); and Steward v. Phillips, Civ. No.
70-1199-F (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 1971).
165. DEPT. OF HEW REPoRT, supra note 88, at 26.
166. Id.
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ments posed a formidable challenge to most states. The implementation
of this type of placement program necessitated a break from traditional
practices. Program Administrative Reviews in the first year of implemen-
tation disclosed that only eleven of the twenty-six states visited had
adopted placement policies that met the requirements of 94-142.11, In its
report to Congress, however, BEH states that it now appears that each of
the state educational agencies will be able to give the assurances required
by 94-142's mandate for LRE. The data, according to BEll, support this
favorable prediction. Data bear out that the greatest number of
handicapped children enrolled in school were placed in regular education
classrooms for the majority of the school day; a comparatively small
percentage of children were served in separate school facilities or
alternative educational settings.168 This finding was expected since the
majority of handicapped children have mild handicapping conditions that
can readily be served in the regular classroom setting, if intensive
specialized instruction is given for part of the day.' 69
The prognosis for the placement of mentally retarded children in the
regular classroom is especially noteworthy. Traditionally, mentally
retarded children have been served primarily in separate classrooms if they
were classified as mildly or moderately retarded, and in separate facilities if
they were classified as severely retarded. In 1976-77, before the mandate of
Least Restrictive Environment became effective, separate class placement
was the prevailing practice for the mentally retarded. The proportion of
mentally retarded children presently placed in the regular classroom, as
reported by BEH, is now thirty-nine percent.170 Hopefully this portends a
trend, not only for the mentally retarded, but for all handicapped children
whose needs can best be met in the regular classroom. A recent case study
indicates a steady increase in the number of resource room placements and
in general a rising trend in the implementation of the Least Restrictive
Environment requirements. 71
A caveat is necessary when discussing the implementation of Least
Restrictive Environment. It is easy to embrace the concept of
"mainstreaming" in a wholesale manner if it is believed that it is the best
solution for the most handicapped children. Placement in the Least
Restrictive Environment, however, does not mean "mainstreaming" in
every case. Some handicapped children cannot benefit from a regular
classroom setting because of specific needs and limitations. To place these
167. Id. at 33. The data was collected in THE NATIONAL ASsoCIATION OF STAFF DiRga'ous OF
SPECIAL EDUCATION, STATE PROFILES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (1977).
i68. 94-142 also emphasizes the integration of handicapped children not only into academic
classes but also into nonacademic classes and into extracurricular activities. Adequate data, however,
do not yet exist regarding the success of the integration.
169. DPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 34.
170. Id. at 36.
171. EDUCATION TURNKEY SYSTEMS, supra note 135.
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children in the regular setting would be inappropriate mainstreaming.
Therefore, as pressure is brought to bear on the states to institute the Least
Restrictive Environment concept, there must be an assurance of diligent
monitoring by BEH to assure that the state, out of frustration or
misconception, is not mainstreaming in a wholesale fashion.
172
"Mainstreaming" has been the most controversial inclusion of 94-142.
It has engendered a great deal of discontent and even hostility in some
settings. These reactions are particularly true from parents who feel that
their children's needs are being adequately met under present segregated
arrangements, and even more particularly true of parents who believe their
children need a protective environment. These beliefs lead, in some cases,
to disputes between schools and parents and have resulted in due process
hearings.
17 1
Both the National Education Association 174 and the American
Federation of Teachers175 support the concept of least restrictiveness, but
only contingent upon the modifications in class size (teacher-pupil ratio)
and the availability of appropriate support services. BEH studies indicate
emerging tensions and outright resistance to mainstreaming by some
professionals and school districts, particularly in those districts with no
previous history of educating the handicapped. Regular classroom
teachers register complaints about lack of trainingin special education and
lack of behavior management techniques to use with "problem"
handicapped children. Those teachers also contend that the instructional
time they must devote to handicapped children will unfairly reduce the
instructional time they can devote to nonhandicapped children.
1 76
The ideals of 94-142 and the concept of Least Restrictive Environ-
ment cannot be.abandoned; certainly, at least, not so soon. The regular
classroom teacher must still be sympathized with, however, and provided
with all possible assistance to make the program work. His or her job in
implementing "mainstreaming" is monumental. It would be a monumental
task for trained personnel in the overcrowded conditions of most
classrooms; it is certain to be an almost overwhelming task for the regular
classroom teacher who has had no training in special education. If
legislation such 'as Proposition 13 in California177 is enacted across the
country, effecting the ideals of 94-142 will be less likely as the available tax
dollars decrease. Therefore, it is the responsibility of BEH and the state
and local school systems to make comprehensive in-service training
programs available to teachers. It is not unthinkable that teachers should
be offered credits toward postgraduate degrees or credit on the salary
172. See H.R. RE.P. No. 332, supra note 108, for reflection of this concern.
173. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 47.
174. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MAINSTREAMING (1976).
175. Letter from Albert Shanker to A.F.T. Leaders (Jan. 18, 1977).
176. DEPT. OF HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at 44.
177. CAL. CONST. art. XIII (A).
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schedules for participation. The teacher is already required to do extra
work; therefore increased compensation should not be out of order. Extra
free time for the teacher to facilitate the recordkeeping and evaluating
tasks should also be considered. In the past, school systems have not been
amenable to these requests; their urgency is now greater than ever. The
regular classroom teacher must be taught to bear up under the pressures of
"mainstreaming," or else the implementation of 94-142, which pivots on
the mainstreaming concept, cannot succeed. The support systems
provided will prove to be a critical ingredient toward program success.
III. CONCLUSION
The attitude of the public toward education of the handicapped has
come a long way since 1919 when the Wisconsin Supreme Court ended
Bud Beattie's formal education. Emphasis has shifted over the years, by
efforts in the courts and especially by those in the legislatures, and focus is
no longer exclusively on the best interests of the "normal" children, 78 but
includes the best interests of the handicapped children. It has finally
become a recognized goal that these two concerns can be fostered in an
integrated system.
Public Law No. 94-142, as the main impetus toward this integration,
is yet in its infant stages. Its successes are noteworthy; its shortcomings are
a subject of great concern. The major problems facing those implementing
the Act are the result of the lack of a trained staff and understaffing. The
partial remedy for both is increased funding, and, in light of inflation and
tax-cutting, this is no small concern. It may be a positive sign that Congress
has recently passed legislation establishing a new cabinet-status Edu-
cation Department.
179
In addition to funding, the other necessary ingredient to the success of
The Education For All Handicapped Act is desire-desire by legislators to
be earnest in follow-up efforts to get their enactment off the report pages
and into the classroom; desire by local administrators to commit
themselves to an appropriate education for the handicapped; and desire by
reluctant parents and classroom teachers to accept a new concept and fight
for its survival. Inherent in that fight is the survival of modern day Bud
Beatties, most of whom will have neither the fortitude nor the support to
prevail as he has.
As interested persons committed to the ideal that all handicapped
children are entitled to receive an equal public education, all educators,
lawmakers, parents, and citizens must be aware that Philip Roos may be
posing the critical question: "Unlike many other animals, man does not
abandon his handicapped offspring. Rather he shelters him, hopes for him,
178. The Beattie courts decision to exclude the handicapped child from public school education
was justified by a best interests test. 169 Wis. at 235, 172 N.W. at 155.
179. Dept of Education Organization Act, P.L. No. 96-88 (signed into law by President Carter
on Oct. 17, 1979).
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dreams for him, and loves him."' 80 But, does man educate his handicapped
offspring? Can the hopes and dreams of a handicapped child be realized
without an education? The answer to the latter question is emphatically
"no," and the answer to the former lies with the successful implementation
of Public Law No. 94-142.181
180. See note I supra.
181. The author would like to especially thank Charles Halpering, Institute for Public
Representation, Georgetown University Law Center, and Robert Plotkin, Mental Health and Law
Project, Washington, D.C., for their enthusiasm and support during the preparation or this
article.

